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Abstract
Double sided auctions are widely used in financial markets to match demand and supply. Prior
works on double sided auctions have focused primarily on single quantity trade requests. We extend
various notions of double sided auctions to incorporate multiple quantity trade requests and provide
fully formalized matching algorithms for double sided auctions with their correctness proofs. We
establish new uniqueness theorems that enable automatic detection of violations in an exchange
program by comparing its output with that of a verified program. All proofs are formalized in
the Coq proof assistant without adding any axiom to the system. We extract verified OCaml and
Haskell programs that can be used by the exchanges and the regulators of the financial markets. We
demonstrate the practical applicability of our work by running the verified program on real market
data from an exchange to automatically check for violations in the exchange algorithm.
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1 Introduction
Computer algorithms are routinely deployed nowadays by all big stock exchanges to match
buy and sell requests. These algorithms are required to abide by various regulatory guidelines.
For example, market regulators make it mandatory for trades resulting from double sided
auctions at exchanges to be fair, uniform and individual-rational.
In this paper, we introduce a formal framework for analyzing trades resulting from double
sided auctions used in the financial markets. To verify the essential properties required by
market regulators, we formally define these notions in a theorem prover and then develop
important results about matching demand and supply. Finally, we use this framework to
verify properties of two important classes of double sided auction mechanisms.
One of the resulting advantages of our work for an exchange or a regulator is that they can
check the algorithms deployed for any violations from required properties automatically. This
is enabled by the new uniqueness results that we establish in this work. All the definitions
and results presented in this paper are completely formalized in the Coq proof assistant
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without adding any additional axioms to it. The complete formalization in Coq facilitates
automatic program extraction in OCaml and Haskell, with the guarantee that extracted
programs satisfy the requirements specified by the market regulator. Consequently, the
extracted program could also be deployed directly at an exchange, apart from checking for
violations in existing programs. We demonstrate the practical applicability of our work by
running the verified program on real market data from an exchange to automatically check
for violations in the exchange algorithm.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief background and
overview of trading at exchanges which is needed to describe our contributions; In Section
3, we briefly state our contributions; Section 4 provides basic definitions and establishes
certain combinatorial results; Section 5 describes a fairness procedure; Section 6 describes the
uniform matching mechanism used in the financial markets; Section 7 describes the maximum
matching mechanism; Section 8 establishes uniqueness results that enables automatic checking
for violations in an exchange matching algorithm; Section 9 describes the practical utility
of our work through running our verified program on real market data from an exchange;
Section 10 concludes the paper with related work and future directions. Parts of some
sections which could not be fully accommodated due to space constraints have been moved
to the appendix of the full version of the paper [5].
2 Background
Financial trades occur at various types of exchanges. For example, there are exchanges for
stocks, commodities and currencies. At any exchange, multiple buyers and sellers participate
to trade certain products. Mostly exchanges employ double sided auction mechanisms to
match the buyers and sellers. Some exchanges, apart from using double sided auctions,
also use an online continuous algorithm for executing trades during certain time intervals,
especially for highly traded products.
For conducting trades of a certain product using a double sided auction mechanism, the
exchange collects buy and sell requests from the traders for a fixed time period. At the end
of this time period, the exchange matches some of the trade requests and outputs trades, all
at a single price. This price is sometimes referred to as the equilibrium price and the process
as price discovery. A buyer places a buy request, also known as a bid, which consists of a
quantity indicating the maximum number of units he is interested in buying and a common
maximum price (bid’s limit price) for each of the units. Similarly, a seller’s sell request, an
ask, consists of a quantity and a minimum price (ask’s limit price). Each trade (transaction)
consists of a bid, an ask, traded quantity, and a trade price. Naturally, the traded quantity
should be at most the minimum of the bid and the ask quantities and the trade price should
be compatible with the bid and the ask.
Apart from the single price property and compatibility constraint mentioned above, there
are other desired properties that the trades (matching) should have. The properties that
capture these constraints are: uniform, individual-rational, fair and maximum. We briefly
describe these matching properties:
Uniform: A matching is uniform if all the trades happen at the same price.
Individual-rational: A matching is individual-rational if for each matched bid-ask pair
the trade price is between the bid and ask limit prices. In the context of financial markets,
the trade price should always be between the limit prices of the matched bid-ask pair.
Fair: A bid b1 is more competitive than a bid b2 if b1 has a higher limit price than b2 or
if their limit prices are the same and b1 arrives earlier than b2. Similarly, we can define
competitiveness between two asks. A matching is unfair if a less competitive bid gets
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matched but a more competitive bid is not fully matched. Similarly, it could be unfair if
a more competitive ask is not fully matched. If a matching is not unfair, then it is fair.
Maximum: A matching is maximum if it has the maximum possible total traded quantity
among all possible matchings.
Optimal individual-rational-uniform: An individual-rational and uniform matching
is called optimal individual-rational-uniform if it has the largest total trade volume among
all matchings that are individual-rational and uniform.
No single algorithm can possess all the above first four properties simultaneously [12, 4].
In the context of financial markets, regulators insist on the matching being fair and optimal
individual-rational-uniform, thus compromising on the maximum property. In other contexts
where the matching being maximum is important along with individual rational and fair,
uniformity is lost. This gives rise to two different classes of double sided auction mechanisms,
each with a different objective. In our work, we consider both these classes of mechanisms.
3 Our Contributions
In this work, we formalize the notion of double sided auctions where trade requests can be of
multiple quantities. Prior to our work, similar notions were explicitly defined only for single
unit trade requests [8, 6, 13]. In going from formalizing the theory for single unit to the
theory of multiple units, the mechanisms and their correctness proofs changed substantially.
Due to the possibility of partial trades, the formal analysis of multiple unit trades becomes
significantly more involved than in [8]. In this work, we show how to efficiently handle this
extra complexity by making the functions and their properties sensitive to the partial trade
quantities. This helps us to develop formal proofs of correctness of the recursive mechanisms
for double sided auctions.
In addition, we provide new uniqueness results that guarantee that the matching algorithm
for the double sided auctions used in the financial markets outputs a unique volume of trades
per order if the algorithm is fair and optimal individual-rational-uniform; thus enabling
automatic checking of violations in the exchange algorithm by comparing its output with
that of a verified program. We demonstrate this by running the extracted OCaml code of our
certified mechanism on real data from an exchange and comparing the outputs. Following is
a brief description of the key results formalized in this work.
Combinatorial result: We show that the modeling and the libraries we created to
obtain our results are also useful in proving other important results on double sided
auctions. For example, in Theorem 7, we show that for any p, no matching can achieve a
trade volume higher than the sum of the total demand and the total supply in the market
at price p.
Fairness: We show that any matching can be converted into a fair matching without
compromising on the total traded volume. For this, we design an algorithm, the Fair
procedure, which takes a matching M as input, and outputs a matching M ′. In Theorem
15, we show that the total traded quantities of M and M ′ are the same and M ′ is a fair
matching.
Uniform mechanism: We design an algorithm, the UM procedure, that takes as input
the bids and the asks and outputs a fair, individual-rational and uniform matching.
Furthermore, in Theorem 20, we show that the output matching has the largest total
trade volume among all the matchings that are uniform and individual-rational and thus
is optimal individual-rational-uniform. This algorithm is used in the exchanges that
output trades using double sided auctions.
ITP 2021
28:4 Verified Double Sided Auctions for Financial Markets
Maximum mechanism: We design an algorithm, the MM procedure, that takes as input
the bids and the asks and outputs an individual-rational, fair and maximum matching.
In Theorem 21, we show that the output matching has the largest total trade volume
among all the matchings that are individual-rational.
Uniqueness theorems: For any two fair and optimal individual-rational-uniform
matchings, Theorem 23 implies that their total trade volume for each order is the same.
Thus, if we compare the trade volumes between an exchange’s matching output with our
verified program’s output and for some order they do not match, then the exchange’s
matching is not fair and optimal individual-rational-uniform. On the contrary, if for
each order, the trade volumes match, then Theorem 24 implies that the exchange’s
matching is also fair and optimal individual-rational-uniform (given that it already is
individual-rational and uniform, which can be easily verified by checking the trade prices).
Making use of these results, in Section 9, we check violations automatically in real data
from an exchange.
The Coq code together with the extracted OCaml and Haskell programs for all the
above results is available at [10]. Our Coq formalization consists of approximately 50 new
definitions, 750 lemmas and theorems and 12000 lines of code. In the following sections, we
provide definitions, procedures and proof sketches that closely follow our actual formalization.
4 Modeling Double Sided Auctions
In a double sided auction multiple buyers and sellers place their orders to buy or sell an
underlying product. The auctioneer matches these buy-sell requests based on their limit
prices, arrival time, and the maximum specified trade quantities. Note that the limit prices are
natural numbers when expressed in the monetary unit of the lowest denomination (like cents
in USA). In our presentation, we will be working with lists (of bids, asks and transactions);
For ease of readability, we will often use set-theoretic notations like ∈, ⊆, ⊇, ∅ on lists whose
meanings are easy to guess from the context.
▶ Definition 1 (Bid). A bid b = (idb, τb, qb, pb) represents a buy request having four compon-
ents. Here, the first two components idb and τb are the unique identifier and the timestamp
assigned to the buy request b, respectively, whereas the third component qb represents the
quota of b, the maximum quantity of the item the buyer is willing to buy. The last component
pb is the limit price of the buy request, which is the price above which the buyer does not
want to buy the item.
▶ Definition 2 (Ask). An ask a = (ida, τa, qa, pa) represents a sell request having four
components. Here, the first two components ida and τa are the unique identifier and the
timestamp assigned to the sell request a, respectively, whereas the third component qa represents
the quota of a, the maximum quantity of the item the seller is willing to sell. The last
component pa is the limit price of the sell request, which is the price below which the seller
does not want to sell the item.
We say that a bid b ∈ B is matchable with an ask a ∈ A if pa ≤ pb.
In a double sided auction, the auctioneer is presented with duplicate-free1 lists of buy and
sell requests (lists B and A, respectively). The auctioneer can match a bid b ∈ B with an ask
1 A list of bids or asks is duplicate-free if all the participating orders have distinct ids.
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a ∈ A only if pb ≥ pa. Furthermore, the auctioneer assigns a trade price and a trade quantity
to each matched bid-ask pair, which finally results in a transaction m. Therefore, we can
represent a matching of demand and supply by using a list whose entries are transactions.
▶ Definition 3 (Transaction). A transaction m = (bm, am, qm, pm) describes a trade between
the bid bm and the ask am. The next two components qm and pm are the traded quantity and
the trade price, respectively. For ease of readability, we use the terms p(bm), p(am), q(bm),
and q(am) for pbm , pam , qbm and qam , respectively.
▶ Definition 4 (Matching M B A). A list of transactions M is a matching between the
duplicate-free lists of bids B and asks A if
1. For each transaction m ∈M , the bid of m is matchable with the ask of m (i.e., p(am) ≤
p(bm)).
2. The list of bids present in M , denoted by BM , is a subset of B (i.e., BM ⊆ B).
3. The list of asks present in M , denoted by AM , is a subset of A (i.e., AM ⊆ A).
4. For each bid b ∈ B, the total traded volume of bid b in the matching M , denoted by
Q(b, M), is not more than its maximum quantity (i.e., for all b ∈ B, Q(b, M) ≤ qb).
5. For each ask a ∈ A, the total traded volume of ask a in the matching M , denoted by
Q(a, M), is not more than its maximum quantity (i.e. for all a ∈ A, Q(a, M) ≤ qa).
Description. Note that there might be some bids in B which are not matched to any asks
in M and some asks in A which are not matched to any bids in M .
▶ Note 5. For simplicity, with slight abuse of notation, we use Q to denote total quantity of
various objects which will be clear from the context. So, Q(b, M) and Q(a, M) represent the
total quantities of the bid b and the ask a traded in the matching M , respectively. Similarly,
the terms Q(B) and Q(A) denote the sum of the quantities of all the bids in B and the sum
of the quantities of all the asks in A, respectively. And also, for the total traded quantity in
a matching M , we use the term Q(M). However, in the Coq implementation, each of these
terms are represented by different names: QMb, QMa, QB, QA and QM.
Formalization notes: We have defined Bid, Ask and Transaction as record types in Coq.
We define the proposition matching_in B A M to be true if and only if M is a matching
between the list of bids B and the list of asks A.
4.1 Matching Demand and Supply
Let B≥p represents the list of bids in B whose limit prices are at least a given number p.
Similarly, A≤p represents the list of asks in A whose limit prices are at most p. Therefore,
the quantities Q(B≥p) and Q(A≤p) represents the total demand and the total supply of the
product at the price p in the market, respectively. Although, in general we cannot say much
about the relationship between the total demand (i.e. Q(B≥p)) and supply (i.e. Q(A≤p)) at
an arbitrary price p, we can prove the following important results about the traded quantities
of the matched bid-ask pairs.














▶ Theorem 7. If M is a matching between the list of bids B and the list of asks A, then for
all natural numbers p, we have Q(M) ≤ Q(B≥p) + Q(A≤p)
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Theorem 7 states that no matching M can achieve a trade volume higher than the sum
of the total demand and supply in the market at any given price.
Proof Idea. We first partition the matching M into two lists: M1 = {m ∈M | p(bm) ≥ p}
and M2 = {m ∈M | p(bm) < p}. Thus, Q(M) = Q(M1) + Q(M2).
It is easy to see that M1 is a matching between B≥p and A, and hence from Lemma 6,
Q(M1) ≤ Q(B≥p).
Next, we prove that M2 is a matching between B and A≤p. Consider a transaction m
from M2. Since m ∈M , p(bm) ≥ p(am), and from the definition of M2, we have p(bm) < p.
This implies p(am) < p, i.e., asks of M2 come from A≤p. Hence, M2 is a matching between
B and A≤p, and applying Lemma 6, we have Q(M2) ≤ Q(A≤p).
Combining, we have Q(M) = Q(M1) + Q(M2) ≤ Q(B≥p) + Q(A≤p), which completes
the proof of Theorem 7. □
Formalization notes: The formal proof of Theorem 7 is completed by first proving the
Lemmas Mbgep_bound (Q(M1) ≤ Q(B≥p)) and Mbltp_bound (Q(M2) ≤ Q(A≤p)) and then
combining them in theorem bound_on_M. These results can be found in the file “Bound.v”.
4.2 Individual-Rational Trades
An auctioneer assigns a trade price to each matched bid-ask pair. In any matching it is
desired that the trade price of a bid-ask pair lies between their limit prices. A matching
which has this property is called an individual-rational (IR) matching.
▶ Definition 8 (Individual rational). Is_IR(M) := for all m ∈M, p(bm) ≥ pm ≥ p(am).
Note that any matching can be converted to individual-rational by changing the price of











































Figure 1 The colored dots represent trade prices for matched bid-ask pairs. Matching M2 is not
IR but M1 is IR, even though both the matchings contain exactly the same bid-ask pairs.
5 Fairness in Competitive Markets
A double sided auction is a competitive event, where the priority among participating traders
is determined by various attributes of the orders. A bid with higher limit price is considered
more competitive compared to bids with lower limit prices. Similarly, an ask with lower limit
price is considered more competitive compared to asks with higher limit prices. Ties are
broken in favor of the requests that have an earlier arrival time. A matching which prioritizes
more competitive traders is called a fair matching.
▶ Definition 9 (Arrow notation).
B
↑ L denotes that the list L is sorted as per the competitiveness
of the bids in L, with the most competitive bid being on top. Similarly,
A
↑ L denotes that the
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list L is sorted as per the competitiveness of the asks in L, with the most competitive ask




↓ for sorting lists where the most competitive
orders lie at the bottom.
In this section, we show that there exists a procedure Fair that takes a matching M
between bids B and asks A as input and outputs a fair matching M ′ = Fair(M, B, A) with
the same trade volume as that of M . To describe the Fair procedure, we will need the
following definitions.
▶ Definition 10. Let M be a matching between bids B and asks A.
M is fair on bids if for all pairs of bids b1, b2 ∈ B such that b1 is more competitive than
b2 and b2 participates in the matching M , then b1 is fully traded in M (i.e., Q(b1, M) =
q(b1)).
Similarly, M is fair on asks if for all pairs of asks a1, a2 ∈ A such that a1 is more
competitive than a2 and a2 participates in the matching M , then a1 is fully traded in M
(i.e., Q(a1, M) = q(a1)).
M is fair if it is both fair on bids and asks.
The Fair procedure works in two steps: first, it sorts the matching M and the asks A
based on the competitiveness of the asks and then runs on them a procedure “fair on asks”
FOA that outputs a matching M ′ that is of the same volume as that of M and is fair on
the asks. In the second step, it sorts the resulting matching M ′ and the bids B based on
the competitiveness of the bids and then runs on them a procedure fair on bids FOB that
outputs a matching M ′′ that is of the same volume as that of M ′ and is fair on the bids.
The Fair procedure returns M ′′ as its output. The procedures FOB and FOA, along with





↑ B) outputs a fair on bids matching and has the same trade volume as that of




↑ B) is fair on
asks. This will immediately imply that the procedure Fair(M, B, A) outputs a fair matching
with the same total trade volume as that of M .
5.1 Fair on Bids
To describe the fair on bids FOB procedure, we first need the following notation.
▶ Definition 11. Given a list L and and an element a, a :: L denotes the list whose top
element (head) is a and the following elements (tail) are the elements of L (in the same
order as they appear in L).
The FOB procedure takes sorted (based on the bids’ competitiveness) lists of transactions
M and bids B. Intuitively, when all the bids are of unit quantity, we want to scan the list of
transactions in M from top to bottom replacing the bids therein with the bids of B from
top to bottom. So, in effect, in the FOB procedure we will implement this intuition apart
from taking care of multiple quantity bids; and also make the procedure recursive so that
we can provide a formalization friendly inductive proof of correctness. Let B = b :: B′ and
M = m :: M ′. In our procedure, we first pick the top bid b of B and the top transaction
m of M , and compare qb with qm. Now we have three cases. In each of the three cases,
the procedure first outputs a transaction between the bid b and the ask of m of quantity
min{qm, qb}. Case I: If qb = qm, we remove b and m from their respective lists and recursively
solve the problem on B′ and M ′. Case II: If qb < qm, we remove b from the list B and update
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qm to qm − qb and recursively solve the problem on B′ and M . Case III: If qb > qm, we
remove m from the list M and set a parameter t to qm that we will send to the recursive call
along with M ′ and B. The parameter t informs our recursive procedure that the top element
b of B has effectively quantity qb − t. Thus, our procedure will take three parameters: the
list of transactions, the list of bids and the parameter t (Note that unlike Case II (qb < qm)
where the top transaction is updated, the top bid is not updated in Case III (qb > qm). This
is done for technical reasons: Later we need to prove that the set of bids of FOB is a subset
of B, and at the same time we have to ensure that the total traded quantity of the bid b in
the matching outputted by FOB remains below its maximum quantity qb, as required by the
matching property. This would not be possible to do if we updated B and hence we take
this approach of keeping the total traded quantity of the top bid b in a separate argument: t
of f .). Keeping this description in mind, we now formally define the procedure FOB.
▶ Definition 12 (Fair On Bid (FOB)).
FOB(M, B) = f(M, B, 0)
where f(M, B, t) =
nil if M = nil or B = nil
(b, am, qm, pm) :: f(M ′, B′, 0) if qm = qb − t
(b, am, qm, pm) :: f(M ′, b :: B′, t + qm) if qm < qb − t
(b, am, qb − t, pm) :: f((bm, am, qm − (qb − t), pm) :: M ′, B′, 0) if qm > qb − t
where M = m :: M ′ when M ̸= nil and B = b :: B′ when B ̸= nil.
▶ Theorem 13. Let M be a matching between bids B and asks A where the lists M and B are
sorted in the descending order of the competitiveness of their bids (i.e., the most competitive
bid and the transaction with the most competitive bid are on top of their respective lists). Let
Mβ = FOB(M, B), then
(a) Mβ is a matching between bids B and asks A.
(b) For each ask a ∈ A, the total traded quantity of a in M is same as the total traded
quantity of a in Mβ (i.e., Q(a, M) = Q(a, Mβ)). As a corollary, we get that if M is fair
on asks, then Mβ is also fair on asks.
(c) The total traded quantity of M is equal to the total traded quantity of Mβ (i.e., Q(M) =
Q(Mβ)).
(d) The matching Mβ is fair on bids.
Proof Outline. Here, we briefly describe certain aspects of the proof; more details can be
found in the full version of the paper [5] and for the complete formalization see [10]. Note
that in each of the recursive calls in f , either the size of the first argument |M | decreases or
the size of the second argument |B| decreases. Therefore, we prove the above statements
using (well founded) induction on the sum (|M |+ |B|). Proof of (a) and (b) is done using
induction and case analysis. The proof of (c) follows by combining Lemma 6 with (b). We
focus on the proof of (d) below.
Let bid b be the top element of the bids B and B = b :: B′. First, we prove two general
results:
For all t, if Q(M) ≥ qb − t, then Q(f(M, b :: B′, t), b) = qb − t,
which states that if the total trade volume of the matching M is at least qb − t, then in the
matching f(M, b :: B′, t) the top bid b has trade quantity qb − t. The proof of this can be
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done using induction on the size of M . Intuitively, f tries to match as much quantity of the
top bid b with the top transaction in M . When the call f(M, b :: B′, t) is made, the top bid
b already has t traded quantity and qb − t of its quantity remains untraded. If the quantity
of the top transaction m of M is at least qb − t, then we are done. Otherwise, f matches qm
quantities of b and recursively calls f on a smaller list and then we will be done by applying
the induction hypothesis.
Now, we state the second general result.
For all t, if distinct bids b, b′ belong to the bids of f(M, b :: B′, t), then Q(M) ≥ qb − t.
This result can be proved, like the previous result, using induction on the sum (|M |+ |B|);
see [10] for details. Intuitively, since b′ is matched by f(M, b :: B′, t) (in particular b′ ∈ B′),
then f(M, b :: B′, t) will completely match b (which has at least qb − t quantity remaining
untraded) before it matches even a single quantity of b′.
Now using the above general results, we prove (d). We need to show the following:
for all b1, b2 ∈ B, if b1 is more competitive than b2 and Q(FOB(M, B), b2) ≥ 1, then
Q(FOB(M, B), b1) = qb1 , i.e., if the bid b2 participates in the matching M then the bid
b1 is fully traded in M . Fix b1, b2 ∈ B such that b1 is more competitive than b2 and
Q(FOB(M, B), b2) ≥ 1. Note that the bid b2 cannot be equal to the bid b since bids B are
sorted. Now we analyze three possible cases: b1 ≠ b, b1 = b and Q(M) ≥ qb, and b1 = b and
Q(M) < qb.
In the case when b1 ̸= b, we consider the recursive call where b1 is the top bid in the
argument for the first time. In this recursive call the list of bids is smaller than B since
the bid b must be fully traded before. Then, we are immediately done by applying the
induction hypothesis.
In the case b1 = b and Q(M) ≥ qb, in the matching FOB(M, b :: B′) = f(M, b :: B′, 0)
the top bid b has total trade volume qb − 0 = qb from the first general result invoked with
t = 0, and hence b1 = b is fully traded.
In the case b1 = b and Q(M) < qb, we arrive at the contradiction Q(M) ≥ qb by invoking
the second general result with t = 0, b = b1, b′ = b2 and FOB(M, b :: B′) = f(M, b :: B′, 0).
□
Similar to the procedure FOB, we have a procedure FOA, that produces a fair matching
on asks (see [10]). Combining the FOA and FOB procedures, we have the following definition
of the Fair procedure.









We conclude this section by formally summarizing the main fairness result.
▶ Theorem 15. If M is a matching on the list of bids B and the list of asks A, then the
matching M ′ = Fair(M, B, A) on B and A is a fair matching such that Q(M) = Q(M ′).
Formalization notes: The procedure FOB and FOA are implemented in Coq using the
Equations plugin which is helpful to write functions involving well-founded recursion [9]. The
proof of Theorem 15 is quite extensive and done in several parts. First we prove all the parts
of Theorem 13 in the file “mFair_Bid.v”. We prove similar theorems for the procedure FOA
in “mFair_Ask.v” file. Later all the results are combined in the file “MQFair.v” and the
above theorem is proved as exists_fair_matching.
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6 Uniform Price Matchings in Financial Markets
Liquidity in a market is a measure of how quickly one can trade in that market and maximizing
the total trade volume helps increase liquidity. However, to maximize the total trade volume









B A B A
(a) UM (b) MM
Figure 2 Both the bids and the asks have quantity one. The only individually rational matching
of size two is not uniform.
Assigning different trade prices for the same product in the same market simultaneously,
might lead to dissatisfaction among some traders. As stated in the introduction, in the
financial markets, the matching should be fair and optimal individual-rational-uniform. In
this section, we describe the UM process that takes as input a list of bids and a list of asks
and produces a fair and optimal individual-rational-uniform matching that can be directly
applied in the financial markets for conducting double sided auctions. We present a novel
proof of optimality of the UM process.
Before we describe the UM process, we first give some intuition. Observe that in any
individual-rational and uniform matching M all the buyers are matched at a single price p
and the price p lies between the limit prices of all the matched bid-ask pairs. This means all
the matched bids’ limit prices are at least p and all the matched asks’ limit prices are at most
p. In the special case when all the orders are of unit quantity, the matching can be visualized
as a fully nested balanced parenthesis (for example, [[[[ ]]]]) where each bid is represented by
a closed parenthesis “]” and each ask as an open parenthesis “[” (See Figure 1).
Now, we describe the UM process. We recursively pair the most competitive available
bid with the most competitive available ask, if they are matchable. The trade quantity for
each matched bid-ask pair is the minimum of the remaining quantities of the respective bid
and the ask. The trade price assigned to each pair is the price of the ask in that pair2. We
terminate the process once there are no more matchable bid-ask pairs remaining. At the end
of the process, to produce a uniform matching we have to assign a single trade price to all
the matched bid-ask pairs which we choose to be the trade price of the last matched bid-ask
pair (which also keeps the individual-rational property intact).
Keeping this description in mind, we now formally define the UM process using recursion.
▶ Definition 16 (Uniform Matching (UM)). .








↑ A, 0, 0)))
where fu(B, A, tb, ta) =
nil if B = nil or A = nil or pb < pa
(b, a, qb − tb, pa) :: fu(B′, A′, 0, 0) if qa − ta = qb − tb and pb ≥ pa
(b, a, qb − tb, pa) :: fu(B′, a :: A′, 0, ta + qb − tb) if qa − ta > qb − tb and pb ≥ pa
(b, a, qa − ta, pa) :: fu(b :: B′, A′, tb + qa − ta, 0) if qa − ta < qb − tb and pb ≥ pa
where B = b :: B′ when B ̸= nil and A = a :: A′ when A ̸= nil.
2 Observe that any value in the interval of the limit prices of the matched bid-ask pair can be assigned as
the trade price and it will not affect any analysis done in this work.
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Description. Observe that, similar to the parameter t in the FOB process, we have two
parameters tb and ta that inform the recursive procedure fu that the top bid b and the
top ask a have effective quantities qb − tb and qa − ta, respectively. In each recursive call,
the process fu outputs a transaction (top bid b, top ask a, quantity min{qb − tb, qa − ta},
price pa). The process fu terminates when the top bid is not matchable with the top ask.
Remark 1. It is easy to see that UM outputs a uniform matching: Once the fu process
terminates, Last_trade_price computes the trade price of the last transaction in the
output of fu and Replace_prices replaces the trade prices of each transaction of the
output of fu with the trade price of the last transaction of the output, thus ensuring UM
produces a uniform matching. Also, notice that the process Replace_prices does not alter
any other information of the output of fu apart from the trade prices (we will later use
this fact in the proof of optimality of UM).
Remark 2. It is easy to see that UM outputs an individual-rational matching: the trade
price of a transaction m outputted by a recursive call of fu is between the limit prices
of the bid and the ask of m. Later these prices are altered by Replace_prices, but the
individual-rational property is not lost; the trade price of m is also between the limit
prices of the transactions of all the previous calls as the bids and the asks are sorted
by their competitiveness, and Replace_prices replaces all the trade prices with the trade
price of the last transaction.
Now, we discuss the optimality result of the UM process. Throughout this discussion,
WLOG, all lists of bids and asks will be sorted by their competitiveness. We make use of the
following notation.
▶ Definition 17. Given a matching M , a bid b and an ask a, we use Q(a↔ b, M) to denote
the total traded quantity between the bid b and the ask a in the matching M .
Next, we state the main result of this section.
▶ Theorem 18. Given a list of bids B and a list of asks A, let MU = UM(B, A) and
let M be an arbitrary individual-rational and uniform matching between B and A. Then,
Q(MU ) ≥ Q(M). In other words, UM outputs an optimal individual-rational-uniform
matching.
To prove the above theorem, we need the following lemma.
▶ Lemma 19. If M is an individual-rational and uniform matching between the lists of bids
B = b :: B′ and asks A = a :: A′ such that Q(M) ≥ min{qb, qa}, then there exists another
individual-rational and uniform matching M ′ between the same lists of bids B and asks A
such that Q(M) = Q(M ′) and Q(a↔ b, M ′) = min{qb, qa}.
Assuming this lemma, we will first prove Theorem 18 and then later prove the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 18. Note that fu(B, A, 0, 0) is a specific instance of fu(B, A, tb, ta). So
in order to apply the induction hypothesis, we sensitize the theorem statement to incorporate
arbitrary values of ta and tb. Also, as indicated earlier, the Replace_prices function does not
alter the total trade quantity of the output of the fu, thus Q(fu(B, A, 0, 0)) = Q(UM(B, A)).
Consequently, showing the following suffices.
(∗) Fix an arbitrary list of bids B = b :: B′ and an arbitrary list of asks A = a :: A′. Fix
arbitrarily tb < qb and ta < qa. Let b′ be the bid obtained from the bid b by reducing its
quantity to qb − tb. Similarly, let a′ be the ask obtained from the ask a by reducing its
quantity to qa − ta. We will show: for all individual-rational and uniform matchings M
between (b′ :: B′) and (a′ :: A′), Q(fu(B, A, tb, ta)) ≥ Q(M).
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Clearly, setting tb = ta = 0 in the above statement (∗) gives us Theorem 18.
We prove the above statement using induction on the sum (|B|+ |A|). We consider two
cases: p(b′) < p(a′) and p(b′) ≥ p(a′).
In the first case, when p(b′) < p(a′), since the most competitive bid in b′ :: B′ is not
matchable with the most competitive ask in a′ :: A′, any matching between b′ :: B′ and
a′ :: A′ is empty. Thus, Q(M) = 0, and we are done.
In the second case, when p(b′) ≥ p(a′), if the total trade quantity of M is less than
the quantity of the transaction created by fu in the first recursive call (i.e., Q(M) <
min{qb − tb, qa − ta} ≤ Q(fu(B, A, tb, ta)), then we are done. In the case when the total
traded quantity of M is more than the quantity of the transaction created by fu in the first
recursive call (i.e., Q(M) ≥ min{qb − tb, qa − ta}), we apply Lemma 19 and get another
individual-rational and uniform matching M ′ such that the total volume of M ′ is equal to the
total volume of M and the total traded quantity between the bid b′ and the ask a′ in M ′ is
equal to min{qb′ = qb − tb, qa′ = qa − ta}. Now since we have M ′ such that Q(M) = Q(M ′),
proving the following suffices.
Q(fu(B, A, tb, ta)) ≥ Q(M ′) (∗∗),
where M ′ is an individual-rational and uniform matching between the list of bids b′ :: B′
and a′ :: A′ such that Q(a′ ↔ b′, M ′) = min{qb−tb, qa−ta}. We define the matching M0 ⊆M
as follows: we remove all transactions between b′ and a′ (of total quantity Q(a′ ↔ b′, M ′))
from M ′ to get M0. We have (†): Q(M ′) = min{qa − ta, qb − tb}+ Q(M0). Also, note that
M0 is individual-rational and uniform (since M ′ ⊇M0 is individual-rational and uniform).
Now we argue the proof of (∗∗) in each of the three recursive branches of the function fu
corresponding to p(b) ≥ p(a).
Case: qa−ta = qb−tb. In this case M0 is a matching between B′ and A′. Since (|B|+|A|) >
(|B′|+ |A′|), we can apply the induction hypothesis to get Q(fu(B′, A′, 0, 0)) ≥ Q(M0).
Now, applying the definition of fu we get,
Q(fu(B, A, tb, ta)) = min{qa − ta, qb − tb}+ Q(fu(B′, A′, 0, 0))
I.H.
≥ min{qa − ta, qb − tb}+ Q(M0)
(†)= Q(M ′).
Case: qa − ta > qb − tb. In this case M0 is a matching between B′ and â :: A′ (where
qâ = qa − ta − (qb − tb) ≤ qa). Since (|B| + |A|) > (|B′| + |â :: A′|), we can apply the
induction hypothesis when B′ ̸= ∅ to get Q(fu(B′, A, 0, ta + (qb − tb))) ≥ Q(M0). When
B′ = ∅, then Q(fu(B′, A, 0, ta + (qb − tb))) ≥ Q(M0) holds trivially as both the sides of
the inequality are zeros. Now, applying the definition of fu we get,
Q(fu(B, A, tb, ta)) = (qb − tb) + Q(fu(B′, A, 0, ta + (qb − tb)))
I.H.
≥ (qb − tb) + Q(M0)
(†)= Q(M ′).
Case: qa − ta < qb − tb. This is symmetric to the previous case and the proof follows
similarly. □
Having finished the proof of the main result, we now discuss the proof of the lemma that
we assumed.
Main proof idea of Lemma 19. Given an individual-rational and uniform matching M
with Q(M) ≥ min{qb, qa} between the list of bids B = b :: B′ and the list of asks A = a :: A′,
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we need to show existence of an individual-rational and uniform matching M ′ such that
Q(M ′) = Q(M) and the total trade quantity between the bid b and ask a in M ′ is min{qb, qa}.
We do the following surgery on M in two steps to obtain the desired M ′.
Step 1: We first modify M to ensure that bid b and ask a each has at least min{qb, qa}
total trades in M (not necessarily between each other). This is accomplished by running
the Fair procedure on M that outputs a matching which prefers the most competitive orders
(b and a) over any other orders. Since Q(M) ≥ min{qb, qa}, we get that Fair(M, B, A)
has at least min{qb, qa} trades for each of b and a. Note that Fair does not change the
total trade quantity or affect the individual-rational and uniform properties of M . Set
M ← Fair(M, B, A).
Step 2: In this step, we modify M to ensure that the bid b and ask a have min{qb, qa}
quantity trade between them. Note that in M individually both b and a have at least
min{qb, qa} total trade quantity. We will inductively transfer trades of b and a that are not
between them to the transaction between b and a, a unit quantity at a time, till they have
min{qb, qa} quantity trade between them. To better understand this, consider the case when
b and a have zero trade quantity between them. Let us say there is a transaction between b
and a1 of quantity q1 and a transaction between a and b1 of quantity q2. We remove these
two transactions and replace it with the following four transactions (see Figure 3) that keeps
the matching trade volume intact: (1) transaction between b and a1 of quantity q1 − 1, (2)
transaction between a and b1 of quantity q2−1, (3) transaction between b1 and a1 of quantity
one and (4) transaction between b and a of quantity one. Recall, in a individual-rational and
uniform matching with price p, the limit price of each bid is at least p and the limit price of
each ask is at most p, implying any bid and ask participating in the matching are matchable.
Thus, doing such a replacement surgery is legal and does not affect the individual-rational












b1 q2 − 1 p
q1 − 1 p
b1 a1 1 p




Figure 3 In the above figure the matching M ′ is obtained from the matching M . Each bid or
ask has the same trade quantity in both M and M ′. Furthermore, the trade quantity between a
and b in M ′ is one more than that in M .
The proof that UM produces a fair matching follows from inducting on the sum (|A|+ |B|)
and the fact that B and A are sorted by competitiveness of the participating bids and
asks. The argument is similar to the correctness proof of Fair that we saw before. From the
discussion above, the next theorem follows immediately.
▶ Theorem 20. For a given list of bids B and the list of asks A, M = UM(B, A) is a fair
and optimal individual-rational-uniform matching on B and A.
Formalization notes: The formalized proof of the above theorem is done by first proving
Lemma 19 (exists_opt_k) using induction on the gap k = min{qb, qa} − Q(a ↔ b, M).
From this lemma, we get another matching M ′ such that Q(a↔ b, M) = min{qb, qa}. The
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matching M ′ is altered to M0 (as described in the proof of Theorem 18 above) by removing
all the transactions between the bid b and the ask a. We prove that the altered list M0 is is
a matching between the reduced lists of bids and asks. All the results related to M0 are in
the file “MachingAlter.v”. Finally, combining all these we prove the main Theorem 20 as
“UM_main”.
7 A Maximum Matching Mechanism
In the previous section, we indicated that to achieve maximum trade volume matching we
sometimes have to assign different trade prices to the matched bid-ask pairs. An individual
rational matching with maximum trade volume is called a maximum matching. In this
section we describe a process MM, that takes a list of bids and a list of asks and outputs a
fair, individual-rational and maximum matching.
The MM procedure roughly works as follows. In step one, the MM procedure repeatedly
pairs the most competitive bid b with the least competitive matchable ask a and outputs a
transaction (b, a, min{qb, qa}, pa) and decreases the quantities of b and a by min{qb, qa}. In
step two, the MM procedure applies the Fair procedure on the output of step one.
The detailed MM procedure and the proof of its correctness are similar to that of the
UM procedure in spirit. In the proof of optimality, we need to prove a lemma similar to
Lemma 19 which states that a given arbitrary individual-rational matching M of sufficiently
large trade volume can be altered to obtain a matching M ′ of the same total trade volume
such that the total trade quantity between the most competitive bid and the corresponding
least competitive matchable ask in M ′ is the minimum of their respective quantities. The
proof of this requires more surgeries as compared to that in the proof of Lemma 19. Besides
this deviation all other arguments of the proof of optimality of MM are similar to that of
UM with minor variations.
The proof of MM producing an individual-rational matching is trivial and the proof that
it produces a fair matching follows from the fact that MM applies the Fair procedure before
it outputs a final matching. We now state the main theorem of this section.
▶ Theorem 21. For a given list of bids B and a list of asks A, MM(B, A) is a fair, individual-
rational and maximum trade volume matching between B and A.
The proof of the above theorem and discussion around the MM procedure can be found
in the full version of the paper [5].
Formalization notes: All the formalization details can be found in [10].
8 Uniqueness Theorem
In this section, we establish certain theorems that enable us to automatically check for
violations in an exchange matching algorithm by comparing its output with the output of
our certified program. Detailed proofs are available in the Coq formalization [10].
Ideally, we would have wanted a theorem that the properties (fair and optimal individual-
rational-uniform) imply a unique matching. Such a theorem would enable us to automatically
compare a matching produced by an exchange with a matching produced by our certified
program to find violations of these properties in the matching produced by the exchange.
Unfortunately, such a theorem is not possible; there exists two different matchings M1 and
M2 on the same list of bids B and asks A, where both are fair and optimal individual-rational-
uniform: M1 = {(b1, a1, 1, p), (b2, a2, 2, p)} and M2 = {(b1, a2, 1, p), (b2, a2, 1, p), (b2, a1, 1, p)}
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on bids B = {b1 = (∗, ∗, 1, p), b2 = (∗, ∗, 2, p)} and asks A = {a1 = (∗, ∗, 1, p), a2 = (∗, ∗, 2, p)}
for some arbitrary price p, timestamps and ids. Note that fairness does not require the most
competitive bid to be paired with the most competitive ask. For example, assuming a1 has
a lower timestamp than a2 and b1 has a lower timestamp than b2 in the above example,
a1 and b1 are not matched in the matching M2, which is a fair matching. Nonetheless, we
can show that given a list of bids B and a list of asks A, all matchings that are fair and
individual-rational-uniform, must have the same trade volume for each trader. This still
allows us to automatically check for violations of the properties in an exchange, by comparing
the trades of each trader produced by the exchange against that produced by our certified
program.
We have the following lemma which formulates this uniqueness relation on the matchings.
▶ Theorem 22. Let M1 and M2 be two fair matchings on the list of bids B and the list of
asks A such that Q(M1) = Q(M2), then for each order ω, the total traded quantity of ω in
M1 is equal to the total traded quantity of ω in M2.
Proof Idea. We now prove the above theorem by using Lemma 6 and deriving a contradiction.
Let M1 and M2 be fair matchings such that Q(M1) = Q(M2). Let b be a buyer whose total
trade quantity in M1 is different (WLOG, more) from his total trade quantity in M2. It is
easy to show that there exists another buyer b′ such that her total traded quantity in M1
is less than her total traded quantity in M2, i.e., Q(M2, b′) > Q(M1, b′) (since the sum of
the total traded quantities of all the bids of B in M1 is equal to the sum of the total traded
quantities of all the bids of B in M2 from Lemma 6).
Now, there can be two cases: (i) b is more competitive than b′ or (ii) b′ is more competitive
than b, as per price-time priority. In the first case, since Q(M1, b) > Q(M2, b), it follows
that Q(M2, b) < Q(M1, b) ≤ qb. This contradicts the fact that M2 is fair on the bids; this is
because a less competitive bid b′ is being traded in M2 (since Q(M2, b′) > Q(M1, b′) ≥ 0 as
noted above), while a more competitive bid b is not fully traded. Similarly, in the second
case, we show a contradiction to the fact that M1 is fair on the bids. □
From the above theorem, we have the following corollary.
▶ Theorem 23. For any two fair and optimal individual-rational-uniform matchings M1 and
M2 on the list of bids B and the list of asks A, for each order ω, the total traded quantity of
ω in M1 is equal to the total traded quantity of ω in M2.
For each trader, we can compare the total traded quantities of the trader in the matching
M1 produced by an exchange with the total traded quantities of the trader in the matching
M2 = UM(B, A) produced by our certified program. If for some trader, the traded quantities
do not match, then from Theorem 20 and Theorem 23 we know that M1 does not have
the desired properties as required by the regulators. On the other hand, if they do match
for all traders, then the following theorem states that M1 is fair (Note that uniform and
individual-rational properties can be verified directly from the trade prices and clearly the
total trade volume of M1 and M2 are the same if the traded quantities are same for each
trader).
▶ Theorem 24. Given a list of bids B and a list of asks A, if M1 is a fair matching and M2
is an arbitrary matching such that for each order ω, the total traded quantity of ω in M1 is
equal to the total traded quantity of ω in M2, then M2 is fair.
The proof follows immediately from the definition of fairness.
Formalization notes: All the theorems in this section are formalized in the file “Unique-
ness.v” using the above proof ideas.
ITP 2021
28:16 Verified Double Sided Auctions for Financial Markets
9 Demonstration: Automatic Detection of Violations in Real Data
Please see Appendix A for details on our demonstration, where we automate the process
of checking violations in trades using verified programs extracted from our formalization.
We then use this to find violations in trades of 100 stocks traded on a real exchange on a
particular day. Below, we describe our findings.
Out of the 100 stocks we checked, for three stocks our program outputted “Violation
detected!”. When we closely examined these stocks, we realized that in all of these stocks, a
market ask order (with limit price = 0), was not matched by the exchange in its trading
output (and these were the only market ask orders in the entire order-book). On the contrary,
market bid orders were matched by them. With further investigation, we observed that
corresponding to each of these three violations, in the raw data there was an entry of update
request in the order-book with a limit price and timestamp identical to the uniform price
and the auction time, respectively. It seems highly unlikely that these three update requests
were placed by the traders themselves (to match the microsecond time and also the trade
price seems very improbable); we suspect this is an exchange’s system generated entry in the
order-book. We hope that the exchange is aware of this and doing this consciously. When
we delete the market asks in the preprocessing stage, no violations are detected. Even if it is
not a violation (but a result of the exchange implementing some unnatural rule that we are
not aware of), it is fascinating to see that with the help of verified programs we can identify
such minute and interesting anomalies which can be helpful for regulating and improving the
exchange’s matching algorithm.
10 Related Works and Future Direction
In an earlier work [8], Sarswat and Singh dealt primarily with single unit trade requests and
thus provided a proof of concept for obtaining verified programs for financial markets. In the
current work, we extend their work to multiple units that results in verified programs which
we run on real market data and establish new uniqueness theorems that enable automatic
detection of violation in exchanges as demonstrated in this work.
Passmore and Ignatovich in [7] highlight the significance, opportunities and challenges
involved in formalizing financial markets. They describe the whole spectrum of financial
algorithms that need to be verified for ensuring safe and fair markets. Iliano et al. [1] use
concurrent linear logic (CLF) to outline two important properties of a continuous trading
system. There are also some works formalizing various concepts from auction theory [2, 3, 11],
particularly focusing on the Vickrey auction mechanism.
In our opinion, future works should focus on developing a theory for continuous double
auctions for financial markets. Currently the specifications for continuous double auctions
are vague and this is an obstacle for obtaining verified programs.
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A Demonstration on real data
In this section, we demonstrate the practical applicability of our work. For this, we procured
real data from a prominent stock exchange. This data consists of order-book and trade-book
of everyday trading for a certain number of days. For our demonstration, we considered
trades for the top 100 stocks (as per their market capitalizations) of a particular day. For
privacy reasons, we conceal the real identity of the traders, stocks and the exchange by
masking the stock names (to s1 to s100) and the traders’ identities. We also converted the
timestamps appropriately into natural numbers (which keeps the time in microseconds, as in
the original data). Furthermore, the original data has multiple requests with the same order
id; this is because some traders update or delete an existing order placed by them before
the double sided auction is conducted. In our preprocessing, we just keep the final lists of
bids and asks in the order-book that participate in the auction. Furthermore, there are
certain market orders, i.e., orders that are ready to be traded at any available price, which
effectively means a limit price of zero for an ask and a limit price of infinity for a bid; in the
preprocessing we set these limit prices to zero and the largest OCaml integer, respectively.
We then extracted the verified OCaml programs and ran them on the processed market
data. The output trades of the verified code were then compared with the actual trades
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in the trade-book from the exchange. From the uniqueness theorems in the Section 8, we
know that if the total trade quantity of each order in these two matchings are equal, then
the matching produced by the exchange has the desired properties (if it is uniform and IR
which can be checked trivially by looking at the prices in the trade-book). We also know
that if they are not equal for some trader, then the matching algorithm of the exchange does
not have the requisite desired properties (or there is some error in storing or reporting the
order-book or the trade-book accurately).
The processed data and the relevant programs for this demonstration are available at
[10]. The extracted OCaml programs of the functions required for this demonstration are
stored in a separate file named “certified.ml”. The input bids, asks and trades of each stock
are in “s.bid”, “s.ask” and “s.trade” files, where “s” is the masked id for that stock. For
example, file “s1.bid” contains all the bids for the stock “s1”. To feed the inputs to the
verified program and to print the output of the certified program, we have written two OCaml
scripts: create.ml and compare.ml. The create.ml script feeds inputs (lists of bids and asks)
to the UM process, and then prints its output matching M . The compare.ml script compares
the matching produced by the UM process M with the actual trades MEX in the exchange
trade-book. If the total trade quantity for all the traders in M matches with that of the
total trade quantity in MEX, then the compare.ml script outputs “Matching does not violate
the guidelines”. If for some bid (or ask) the total trade quantity of M and MEX does not
match, then the program outputs “Violation detected!”.
